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‘Blessed is he whose mind hadpower to probe/The causes ofthings,’ Virgil wrote, thinking of
Lucretius. But for many, knowing the
causal origins of things can be reason for
anxiety. Just as we might worry that tracing
our family trees will turn up slave owners 
or madmen, we might also worry that 
genealogical investigation into our most
cherished beliefs, values and practices will
reveal what Nietzsche called pudenda origo, a
shameful origin. We might even feel, in the
light of our new knowledge, that we should
try to abandon those beliefs, values and
practices. The worry that origins will turn
out to be shameful rather than noble, a
source of discredit not vindication, might
be called ‘genealogical anxiety’.
Thus while many philosophers – Aristotle,
Hobbes, Locke and Hegel among them –
believed that genealogical accounts could
both elucidate and justify, for example, the
existence of the state or the reliability of hu-
man reason, Nietzsche perceived a more
corrosive dimension to gen ealogical think-
ing. In On the Genealogy of Morality, he argued
that the origins of modern morality – in-
cluding, among other things, our commit-
ment to equality, justice and rights – lie in a
crafty ‘slave revolt’ perpetrated by the weak
and disenfranchised against the strong and
admirable. This revelation played a crucial
(if somewhat opaque) role in motivating 
his vision of a new, post-Christian moral -
ity. Nietzsche’s innovation prompted a huge
cult ural shift towards subversive genealog -
ical thinking – what might be called the
‘Gen ealogical Turn’ – including Freudian
ana lysis, 20th-century Marxism, Foucault’s
historical epistemology, certain strands of
postcolonial and feminist theory, and much
of what goes by the label ‘postmodernism’.
These ideological programmes operate by
purporting to unmask the shameful origins
– in violence, sexual repression, gender or
racial hegemony and economic and soc ial
oppression – of our concepts, beliefs and
political struct ures.
Despite all this, contemporary philo -
sophy in the analytic tradition has seemed
mostly untouched by genealogical anxiety.
In the early 20th century, logical positivists
took pains to point out that such think -
ing was undermined by the ‘genetic fal -
lacy’: the mistaken assumption that ‘bad’
origins necessarily make for false beliefs 
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or illegit imate practices. Obviously, a bad
origin can result in a true belief. I might 
believe that the world will be destroyed 
by steadily rising temperatures because a
lunatic told me so, but that doesn’t mean
that climate change is not real. Somewhat
less obviously, a practice might have a bad
origin but be morally valuable. For example,
the legalis ation and dissemination of birth
control has its origins in Marie Stopes’s 
eugenicist fant asies, but is thought by most
to be a very good thing. This is not to say
that origins are irrelevant to issues of value,
truth or just ification: finding out that you
were on a hallucinogenic drug when you
formed the belief that a goat ate your com-
puter should certainly give you pause. But it
is to suggest that the relationship between
origins on one hand, and truth, justific -
ation and value on the other, is not nearly 
as straight forward as many pro ponents of
the Gen ealogical Turn seem to think. 
Nonetheless, sloppy genealogical reason -
ing has become a commonplace both in 
academic circles and in the wider culture. 
It has become standard dialectical form to
rebut a claim with ‘you only believe that 
because . . .’, as if simply unmasking the
origins of an opponent’s belief were suffic -
ient to debunk it. This is unfortunate be-
cause, after all, we believe everything we do
because of various background facts and
factors; thinking carefully about genealogy
requires sorting out when and why these
things matter. While not all genealogical
critiques offend against these requirements,
many do, and this has provided analytic
philosophers with an easy excuse for ignor-
ing them.
This in turn goes some way towards 
explaining analytic philosophy’s growing
isolation within the humanities. From the
perspective of many, philosophy’s failure to
recognise itself as a contingent product of
culture and history makes the discipline
seem precious and antiquated at best, dog-
matic at worst. At the same time, philo -
sophy has increasingly aligned itself with
the natural sciences, which share its con -
fidence in the pursuit of objective truth. Of
course, the close relationship between phil -
osophy and the sciences is nothing new,
and while (like most long-standing re -
lationships) it is not without its tensions
and occasional recriminations, it is mostly
amic able. A long philosophical tradition,
in cluding Aristotle, Hume, Locke and their
numerous successors, concerns itself with
thinking through the implications of a
broad ly scientific picture of the world and
mind, and reconciling that picture with what
Wilfrid Sellars called the ‘manifest image’,
the way the world appears to us in every -
day experience. Philosophers of science take
scientific investigation as a model of ration-
ality, and try to make sense of the meta-
physical implications of theories in physics
and biology. More recently, philosophers of
mind have used the empirical findings of
the cognitive sciences – especially neuro-
science and social, developmental and evol -
utionary psychology – to formulate and 
revise claims about the workings of per -
ception and the organisation of mental
structure.
There is, however, a growing belief in
some corners that the cognitive sciences 
are making philosophy irrelevant. This is
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not simply because the cognitive sciences
are increasingly busying themselves with
topics – such as morality, free will and re -
ligion – that are traditionally regarded as
philosophical territory. It is also because the
cognitive sciences are being used to launch
a methodological attack on philosophy’s
traditional thought-experimental method.
This, simply put, involves considering 
hypothetical scenarios in order to elicit in
oneself (or an interlocutor) ‘intuitive judg-
ments’, and then attempting to fit these in-
tuitions into an elegant explanatory theory.
In a manner that bears a striking resem-
blance to Nietzsche’s attack on morality,
some sceptics (often going by the name of
‘experimental philosophers’) are using em-
pirical methods to suggest that our philo-
sophical intuitions are mere genealogical
quirks, whose origins lie in social and 
cultural contexts, evolution and neurophys-
iology. For example, Jonathan Weinberg,
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich argue
that people’s judgments about what con -
stitutes knowledge – a central question in
analytic philosophy – depend on whether
they are ‘East Asian’ or ‘Western’. And re-
search by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols
suggests that people’s judgments about 
the relationship between determinism and
moral responsibility are susceptible to what
psychologists call ‘affect’. When asked, in
the abstract, whether a person who lives in
a deterministic world is morally respons -
ible for his actions, subjects tend to say 
not. However, when they are presented with
the case of Bill, who lives in a deterministic
world and murders his wife and children in
order to be with his secretary, subjects over-
whelmingly judge that Bill is, indeed, moral-
ly responsible for his actions. Results of this
kind, the sceptics argue, discredit tradition -
al philosophical methodology: it is time for
the laboratory to replace the armchair.
In response to this challenge, analytic
philosophers typically respond in one of
two ways. Either they succumb to genealog-
ical anxiety and throw in their lot with the
sceptics, or (more often) they ignore the
challenge and carry on with armchair busi-
ness as usual. Both responses, the defeatist
and the reactionary, are intellectually lazy.
And both fail to see what many philosoph -
ers have failed to see since Nietzsche: that
genealogical anxiety is neither a sign of 
the apoc alypse nor a distraction to be dis-
missed, but rather an invitation to do more
phil osophy. To make sense of the data pro-
duced by cognitive scientists, we need the
concept ual refinements and subtle distinct -
ions that are the meat and potatoes of ana-
lytic philo sophy. Moreover, to draw out the
philosoph ical implications of the cognitive
sciences (not least for the legitimacy of phil -
osophical methodology), we must return to
central philosophical questions about the
relationship of mind to world, knowledge
and just ification, and the nature of value.
While it would be foolish to think that phil -
osophy can ignore the laboratory, it would
be just as foolish to think that the cognitive
sciences can get by without the armchair.
Tamar Szabó Gendler, who is chair of 
the philosophy department and a former
chair of the cognitive science programme at
Yale, sees her two disciplines as mutually
re inforcing, in the self-declared spirit of 
Aristotle and Hume. The cognitive sciences,
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she argues, shed light not only on various
first-order questions in philosophy (espec -
ially those in philosophy of mind and act -
ion), but also on how traditional armchair
philosophy, pace the sceptics, can lead us to
knowledge. In turn, she demonstrates how
philosophy enables us to make sense of re-
sults in the cognitive sciences, giving us a
better understanding of mental life.
Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical
Methodology is divided into two parts: the
first collects Gendler’s various essays on
methodology, the second her work in the
philosophy of mind. A central question in
the first part of the book is: why should
philosophers hope to learn anything about
the world simply by conducting thought ex-
periments? Are these hypothetical imagin-
ings merely a rhetorical device, or do they
have genuine epistemological significance
– that is to say, the capacity to produce
knowledge? Gendler’s account dwells on
the role of thought experiments in the nat -
ural sciences, and pays particular attention
to Galileo’s refutation of the Aristotelian
theory that heavy bodies fall faster than
lighter ones. In Galileo’s thought exper -
iment, a heavy object and a light object are
strapped together and dropped from a
height. The Aristotelian theorist is forced to
make two conflicting predictions: first, that
the rate at which the strapped object falls
will be somewhere between the rates at
which the two independent objects fall;
and, second, that since the strapped object
is heavier than either of its constituents, it
will fall faster than either of the independ-
ent objects. To avoid this contradiction, it
appears that he must reject his theory that
the speed at which bodies fall is pro -
portional to their weight. 
But is that necessarily so? As Gendler
points out, the Aristotelian could, in princ -
iple, reject any number of his theoretical
commitments to get out of the contra -
diction. For example, he could deny that
strap ped ‘objects’ are really objects at all,
and insist that only ‘real’ objects are gov-
erned by his theory. But he won’t do this,
Gendler argues, because the nature of the
thought experiment is such that it triggers
his tacit knowledge that strapped objects
(for the purposes of the laws of physics) are
indeed objects. Since our tacit knowledge
of the world is often in conflict with our 
explicit theoretical commitments, abstract
argument is often insufficient to bring it 
to the fore. Thought experiments, by foc -
using the imagination on specific cases,
have a unique capacity to reveal such tacit 
knowledge. 
That said, Gendler seems torn between
the claim that thought experiments reveal
pre-existing knowledge, and the distinct
claim that thought experiments create new
knowledge by conferring justification on
beliefs. Furthermore, she admits she has
little to say on the matter of how thought 
experiments might operate as a source of
epistemic justification, apart from hypo -
thesising that we have some prima facie
right to trust the intuitive ‘seemings’ elicit-
ed by such experiments – in the same way
that we have, presumably, a prima facie
right to trust our senses. As such, her de-
fence of thought experiments might be only
partly satisfying to readers who are already
sceptical of philosophical methodology.
5 2 september 2011
Nonetheless, by drawing an explicit con-
nection between the use of thought ex -
periments both in philosophy and in the 
sciences, Gendler reminds us that a hasty
critique of philosophical methodology will
threaten the foundations of empirical sci-
ence as well. A naive attack on philosoph -
ical reasoning from the standpoint of the
sciences presupposes a line between the
arm chair and the laboratory that cannot
cleanly be drawn.
This is not to say that Gendler is entire -
ly sanguine about armchair methods. In
‘Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuit -
ions and Cognitive Equilibrium’, she dis -
cusses the methodological implications of
the fact that our intuitive judgments about
hypothetical cases vary with the present -
ation of those cases, as in the study of free
will and determinism I mentioned earlier.
Gendler argues that this is best explained in
terms of dual-processing: we might employ
two different psychological processes for
evaluating the same sub ject matter (for 
example, whether or not an agent is morally
re spons ible), each one triggered by differ-
ent con ditions, and each delivering a di -
stinct answer. As such, the thought exper -
iment method can be expected, in some
cases, to leave us in a state of cognit ive dis-
equilibrium, with two conflicting intuitions
about the same question. While Gendler
doesn’t attempt a normative judgment as to
how we ought to proceed in such cases, 
she does note that the problem isn’t really 
new (as many critics of the armchair appear
to think). Indeed, this phenomenon is an 
essential precondition of philosoph ical per -
suasion. Philosophers aren’t merely execut -
ors of reason who seek to system atise their
intuitive judgments. Rather, they are often
engaged in changing those judgments.
Gend ler discusses John Rawls’s famous
‘orig inal position’, a hypothetical scenario
in which rational agents decide how they
will organise their society from behind a
‘veil of ignorance’ that prevents them from
knowing their future role in that society.
The power of the ‘original position’, she 
argues, is that it gives us a framework for
reconceptualising questions about fairness
and justice. Here, the point isn’t whether or
not science discredits philosophical meth -
odology: the example of Rawls shows that
philosophy is, at its best, an art.
In the second part of the book, Gendler
includes several rich empirical essays on
the workings and interrelations of imagin -
ation, pretence, belief and self-deception.
Also reprinted here are her two essays on
‘alief ’, a concept she introduced to char -
acterise a wide range of psychological phen -
omena in which our explicit beliefs seem to
conflict with our behaviour. Imagine a per-
son standing on a large walkway made of
glass, suspended high above the ground;
although he knows he is safe, he trembles
with fear nonetheless. Or take the subjects
of a psychology experiment who refuse to
drink orange juice out of bedpans they
know to be new and sterile. Or the well doc -
umented phenomenon of ‘aversive rac ism’,
in which Caucasian subjects who explicitly
and sincerely declare themselves believers
in racial equality systematically display rac -
ist behaviour under test conditions, for ex-
ample by being quicker to match images of
black people with negative words, or being
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less likely to grant an interview to someone
with a stereotypically African American name
than to someone with an ‘English’ name
though their CVs are otherwise ident ical.
How should we interpret this phenomenon?
One option is to say that these subjects do
not believe what they claim to believe; in
fact, they believe that they are going to 
fall, or that the orange juice is contaminat-
ed, or that black people are inferior. Another
option is to conclude that we are capable of
holding conflicting beliefs: we can believe
the glass walkway is both safe and unsafe,
and can be both egalitarians and bigots. But
Gendler suggests instead that these auto-
matic behavioural responses are caused by
a distinct cognitive state: alief, as distinct
from belief. To have an alief is to have an
‘innate or habitual propensity to respond 
to an apparent stimulus in a particular 
way’. Aliefs typically operate without the 
intervention of conscious thought and are
therefore not directly susceptible to ration-
al control (though Gendler presents some
strategies for bringing one’s aliefs into 
accordance with one’s beliefs, which is of 
particular importance in cases of biased
aliefs). She also explains how aliefs help us
to make sense of such phenomena as the
pleasure we take in horror films; while it
can be a source of worry, the discord be-
tween our beliefs and aliefs can also 
enrich human experience.
In some ways, the concept of alief 
doesn’t add much to our theorising about
cognition. Many psychologists will think
the phenomenon already adequately ident -
ified under the rubric of associatively activ -
ated representations, and Gendler herself
thinks that explanations in terms of alief
are compatible with those based on such 
familiar concepts as instinct, habit, imag-
ining and hypocrisy. But what is both useful
and provocative about alief is that it invites,
not least by its name, comparisons and con-
trasts with the phenomenon of belief. The
orthodox philosophical view is that belief 
is a mental state that aims at the truth and 
is responsive to evidence and argument; 
the possibility of rationality turns on this
conception. However, if our superstitions,
biases and some of our automatic responses
are beliefs – beliefs which are generally un-
responsive to evidence and argument – then
the orthodox view of belief, and the poss -
ibility of rationality, is threatened. By mak-
ing a distinction between alief and belief,
even if it amounts to nothing more than a
useful bit of folk psychology, Gendler is
able to capture the intuition that there is
something belief-like about these auto -
matic responses, while preserving the poss -
ibility of rational deliberation. 
Despite Gendler’s optimism about the
prospect of mutually reinforcing knowl-
edge and understanding, the perspectives
of philosophy and the cognitive sciences on
the human subject are, in some ways, fund -
amentally different. Philosophy presupposes
rational agents who are responsive to argu-
mentation and evidence; the cognitive sci-
ences increasingly suggest that we might not
fit that description, at least not to the extent
that philosophers would like. Gendler en-
courages us to accept ‘our fate as embodied
beings capable of rational reflection living
in an imperfect world’. By urging us to view
ourselves not only as the objects of empir -
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ical enquiry, but also as the subjects of reas on
and understanding, she issues once again
the invitation to do more philosophy. c
